This is basically the book you want for understanding diamat. No more excuses!
I recommend following along with the linked audiobook in the infobox, the audiobook is a slightly more digestible edition (so reading + listening). For maximum learning take notes while reading or try to synthesize the chapters with your own words.
It's part of my 6-book absolute beginner list. This will depend on your time but a- try to fit reading anywhere you can (on commute, on break) and b- you can break it up like so:
The philosophical problems to idealism and materialism (included)
Idealism to just before "the philosophical materialism"
the philosophical materialism to just before history of materialism
history of materialism to just before study of dialectics (or break up the metaphysics chapters into its own chunk)
study of dialectics to 1. the dialectical change (included)
reciprocal action
contradiction
transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa
the historical materialism down to just before 'where do classes and economic conditions come from'
where do classes and economic conditions come from
dialectical materialism and ideologies down to conclusion (finish book)
Reminder also on prolewiki you can tap the gear icon to customize your reading experience.
I still have to read the one which addresses historical materialism.
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Camarada Forte - 2mon
This is the book that turned me into Marxism. I saw a suggestion to read it in a left-wing chanboard, bought the book, and how lucky was I that a random stranger in the internet gave me a goldmine. Once I read it, I finally realized my place as a human in time and space.
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BumbyJohnson - 2mon
Holy hell this is a good read, if I stumbled upon this earlier I might not had a mental breakdown. So much dissonance and thoughts I have had has been put into perspective reading this. I really did not understand the difference between materialism and idealism until today and now I have a better understanding of dialectical materialism, thank you.
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Commiejones - 2mon
Good book. Wish I read it sooner it might have made the trip a lot easier. Feels like a good book to suggest to proto-comrades.
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Cowbee [he/they] - 2mon
I agree, that's why I put it near the beginning of the ML intro list I made. It was super helpful with making Marxism "click" for me!
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Comrade_Improving - 2mon
Huge comment with something that I was working some time ago:
Although Politzer makes a great job describing the history of Philosophy, Materialism and Dialectics in a way that is easy to follow. He has a crucial misunderstanding of dialectics and consequently is inconsistent in his own application of Dialectical Materialism, and as such I personally do not recommend this book for a beginner that won't be able to separate the mistakes from the correct parts.
His misunderstanding of dialectics centers around the way he views contradictions:
This is the fourth character of the metaphysical method, which opposes opposites to one another and affirms that two opposites cannot exist at the same time. Indeed, in this example of life and death, there can be no third possibility. It is absolutely necessary for us to choose one or the other of the possibilities that we have distinguished. We consider that a third possibility would be a contradiction, that this contradiction is an absurdity and, therefore, an impossibility. (Chapter 3.1.1.4 - Opposition of Opposites)
In life, there are forces which maintain life, which tends toward the affirmation of life. Then there are also forces in living organisms which tend towards negation. In everything, some forces tend towards affirmation and others towards negation, and, between affirmation and negation there is a contradiction. Hence, dialectics observes change, but why do things change? Because they are not in agreement with themselves, because there is a struggle between forces, between internal antagonisms, because there is contradiction. Here is the third law of dialectics: Things change because they contain contradictions within themselves. (Chapter 4.2.3 - Thing turn into their opposite)
Politzer sees internal contradictions as two opposing forces inside a thing, when in fact dialectical contradiction is the struggle between two stages of development (two identities, two categories, two moments, two possibilities, etc.) of a thing.
The way that Hegelian Dialectics deals with contradictions actually comes from how Kant's Critical Philosophy dealt with the limitations of Metaphysics:
::: spoiler G.W.F. Hegel - Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline
§48 - In reason’s attempt to know the second unconditioned object, the world, it falls into antinomies, i.e. the affirmation of two opposite sentences about the same object and, indeed, in such a way that each of these sentences must be affirmed with equal necessity. From this it follows that the worldly content, whose determinations incur such a contradiction, cannot be something in itself, but only appearance. The resolution is that the contradiction does not apply to the object in and of itself, but pertains solely to reason engaged in trying to know.
§60 - For the former, an individual determinateness becomes the sensation of something negative, because, qua alive, they carry within themselves the universality of the living nature that is beyond the individual, they maintain themselves even in the negative of merely themselves, and feel this contradiction as it exists within themselves. This contradiction is in them only insofar as both exist in the one subject, namely the universality of its feeling for life and the negative individuality opposed to this. A barrier, a lack of knowing is determined precisely to be a barrier or lack only through a comparison with the existing idea of the universal, of what is whole and complete. Therefore, it is merely a lack of consciousness not to realize that the designation of something as finite or limited contains the proof of the actual presence of the infinite, the unlimited, that the knowledge [Wissen] of a boundary can exist only insofar as the unbounded exists on this side, in consciousness.
:::
But for dialectics, the contradictions within the determinations of things become the source of the "self-sublation" of things that lead to their continuous change.
::: spoiler More Hegel
§81 - (Beta) The dialectical moment is the self-sublation of such finite determinations by themselves and their transition into their opposites.
The dialectical, when taken in isolation by the understanding, constitutes scepticism, particularly when displayed in scientific
concepts. It contains mere negation as the result of the dialectical.
(...) Reflexion is at first a process of going beyond the isolated determinacy, i.e. a relating of it, whereby it is brought into a relationship, despite its being maintained in its isolated validity. The dialectic is, by contrast, this immanent process of going beyond [such determinacy] wherein the one-sided and limited character of the determinations of the understanding presents itself as what it is, namely as their negation. Everything finite is this, the sublating of itself. Thus, the dialectical moment constitutes the moving soul of the scientific progression and is the principle through which alone an immanent connection and necessity enters into the content of science, just as in general the true, as opposed to an external, elevation above the finite resides in this principle.
:::
The consequences of this misunderstanding become even more clear when he deals with "Affirmation, negation and negation of negation"
A thing begins by being an affirmation which comes from negation. (...) Destruction is a negation. (...) Hence, we see that the negation which dialectics speaks of is another way of speaking of destruction. There is a negation of what disappears, of what is destroyed. (Chapter 4.2.3.3 - "Affirmation, negation and negation of negation")
As for him contradictions are opposite forces (not moments, categories, etc.) every dialectical step becomes a destruction of the former and not a "sublation" of the thing into another chapter of its own movement.
6
Comrade_Improving - 2mon
Part 2:
Which also leads him to fall for the Subjective Idealism of Fichtean dialectics:
Affirmation also called thesis - Negation or Anti-thesis - Negation of the negation or synthesis - These words summarize dialectical development. They are used to represent the sequence of stages, to indicate that each stage is the destruction of the preceding one. (Chapter 4.2.3.3 - "Affirmation, negation and negation of negation")
And consequently cause the contrast we can observe between him and Engels when the latter also deals with the negation of the negation:
::: spoiler F. Engels - Anti-Duhring - part I - Chapter XIII
Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio – every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. (...) This has to be learnt, like everything else.
:::
Which is made even more clear when they both use similar examples to explain their methods:
Chapter 4.2.3.3 - "Affirmation, negation and negation of negation":
The chick is an affirmation born from the negation of the egg. It is one stage of the process. But the chick, in turn, will be transformed into a hen. During this transformation, there will be a contradiction between the forces which fight to make the chick become a hen and those which fight to make the chick remain a chick. The hen will thus be the negation of the chick, the latter having derived from the negation of the egg. The hen will therefore be the negation of the negation.
The chick is the negation of the egg, since by being born it destroys the egg. Similarly, the ear of wheat is the negation of the grain of wheat. The grain will germinate in the soil; this germination is the germination of the grain of wheat and will produce a plant. This plant, in turn, will flower and produce an ear; the latter will be the negation of the plant or the negation of the negation.
F. Engels - Anti-Duhring - part I - Chapter XIII:
Let us take a grain of barley.
Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a
grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then
under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain
as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it,
the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is
fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the
stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again
the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold.
With most insects, this process follows the same
lines as in the case of the grain of barley. Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg by a
negation of the egg, pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, pair
and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female
has laid its numerous eggs.
If we follow Politzers logic in Engels example we'd arrive in the conclusion that: after destroying the egg, the caterpillars' own negation, the chrysalis would already be the negation of the negation of the egg, before even getting to the butterfly. But with the dialectical Engels, the negation of the negation only appears when the insect's process comes back to its own beggining with the egg itself, in its own re-affirmation, in its own proliferation.
There thus appears the worst consequence of the confusion between hegelian and Fitchean Dialectics:
But while negation means destruction, it does not mean just any kind of destruction, but dialectical destruction. Thus, when we crush a flea, it does not die from internal destruction, from dialectical negation. Its destruction is not the result of autodynamic stages; it is the result of a purely mechanical change. Destruction is a negation only if it is a product of affirmation, if it comes from it. (Chapter 4.2.3.3 - "Affirmation, negation and negation of negation")
Politzer is forced to limit it's own dialectics claiming that it does not encompass an "purely mechanical change" and therefore leaves things to a an external force, not comprehensible by dialectical laws of internal contradictions, and in this moment he falls into agnosticism himself.
Contrasting his example of crushing a flea with Mao's example of the result of a battle:
::: spoiler Mao Zedong - On Contradiction - Chapter I
The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development. Contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of its development, while its interrelations and interactions with other things are secondary causes. (...) In battle, one army is victorious and the other is defeated, both the victory and the defeat are determined by internal causes. The one is victorious either because it is strong or because of its competent generalship, the other is vanquished either because it is weak or because of its incompetent generalship; it is through internal causes that external causes become operative.
:::
While Politzer sees the crushing of a flea caused by external factor and hence outside of dialectical consideration, if we follow Mao's dialectics in the same example we understand that it is a consequence of the flea's own internal contradictions that make it possible for the external force to crush it or not, therefore the cause and, dialeticaly, the solution, of whether it is resistant enough to resist the external force or not, lies within the flea itself.
Hence, we must be very careful when we explain or when we apply the interpenetration of opposites to an example or to a study. We should avoid trying to find everywhere and to apply mechanically, for example, the negation of the negation, or to find the interpenetration of opposites everywhere, for our knowledge in general is limited and this can lead us to blind alleys. (Chapter 4.2.3.6 - Mistakes to Avoid)
He does realize the limitations of his own method, and as such warns us against it, but without adding on how to expand those limits of our own knowledge or how to approach this "purely mechanical change" he left outside dialectics, we are left in a state where there may be things that are incomprehensible by the human mind, giving even more way to agnosticism.
While still a minor mistake in his work, I've already seen people (even here) go against his cautions and expand this misunderstanding into the basis of dialectics, assuming that Marxist Dialectics is based on "thesis - Anti-thesis - synthesis" and consequently arriving at even greater errors.
As such even if most of this book is of great value for someone reading about dialectical materialism for the first time, it also contain a couple of misunderstandings that might lead to problems in inexperienced hands, because of that, for those that want an introduction to Dialectical Materialism I recommend to read instead: F. Engels - Socialism Utopian and Scientific, Mao - On Contradiction and M. Cornforth - Materialism and the Dialectical Method (specifically for those that already read Politzer's book, Mao's On Contradiction is a great way to expand in the exact aspect that this book was limited) and for a more complete comprehension of Marxist Dialectics, the essentials: F. Engels - Anti-Duhring and V. Lenin - Materialism and Empirio-criticism.
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Cowbee [he/they] - 2mon
This was a great write-up, comrade. I've read Mao, so personally Politzer's mistake has been rectified in me, but I must've forgotten Politzer's framing of negation. I'm reconsidering leaving it in my intro ML reading list, I do put Mao right after but perhaps I should restructure that entirely.
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Comrade_Improving - 1mon
Thanks, I have had the material for this write-up for quite some time, but only now had the situation that finaly pushed me into finishing it, definitely took longer than I expected...
Your consideration is a quite interesting one, because the book I recommend (M. Cornforth's) doesn't approach the history of philosophy with the same depth as Politzer's, so even if he explains Dialectical Materialism in more complete and correct manner, there is definitely going to be some loss in replacing one by the other. But then again, almost all the good points in Politzer's book are already contained in either Engels's "Anti-Duhring" or Lenin's "Materialism and empiro-criticism", so to the person that makes that far the confusion generated by this book is likely more damaging than its merits. You should consider what is more relevant in your opinion then.
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Cowbee [he/they] - 1mon
The biggest obstacle in my eyes is that Cornforth's work isn't on Prolewiki or a similarly easy to read mobile format. My list is very intentionally targeting reading or listening on your phone as the baseline, with the option for the reader to use eReaders or physical copies if they desire.
I do plan on trimming some works (like Ian Paul Wright's essay). I would love to be able to throw Anti-Dühring and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism on the list, but I think those may be more advanced. It's a bit of a toss-up, really, and I'm open to new ideas. My list is a collaborative project anyways.
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Comrade_Improving - 1mon
I get that obstacle personally, one of the consequences of the low popularity of Cornforth's work is that there is no translation of it in my native language, so I can only recommend it to people with very advanced english, which is very limiting. Considering that this book was the one that allowed me to understand Dialectical Materialism, it is kind of sad that it cannot be easily recommended because is not so accessible as a consequence of not being that popular in the first place, but sadly there's not much we can do about that now.
Also while I understand the need to make the reading as simple as possible, I do think that "Anti-Dühring" and "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" are essentials in any theory reading list, they cover in great detail both sides of Dialectical Materialism and as such are great basis for anyone looking to become a Marxist. And at least for me personally, reading more complex books after having a better understanding of the logic behind them made it much easier than before, so in the long term those books can actually become time savers.
This is also my opinion, but the way I see it, the value of reading revolutionary theory is defined by how much you can act with it, which is why I give such importance to the understanding of Marxist Dialectics, because its correct comprehension can help guide actions both in personal matters as in more complex social ones, both in short and long term.
As they are the basis of Marxism, while one can learn Marxist Dialectics without learning Marxist social-economic theory, their scope of actions will just be considerably limited, the other way around actually poses multiple dangers, they can either hold the theory as dogmas and become ultras, see contradictions as a consequences of external factors and as such become revisionists thinking that a peaceful implementation of capitalism is possible, or at best become pure intellectuals who know important facts about the developments happening in our world, but are unable to take any action upon it.
I'm sorry this became quite a rant, but my main point is that not only does understanding of Marxist philosophy help the understanding of Marxist theory, but without revolutionary philosophy the revolutionary theory leads nowhere.
::: spoiler Mao - On Contradiction (VII. Conclusion)
If, through study, we achieve a real understanding of the essentials explained above, we shall be able to demolish dogmatist ideas which are contrary to the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and detrimental to our revolutionary cause, and our comrades with practical experience will be able to organize their experience into principles and avoid repeating empiricist errors. These are a few simple conclusions from our study of the law of contradiction.
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Cowbee [he/they] - 1mon
I absolutely agree with the importance of developing solid understanding of dialectical materialism early, that's why it's the first section on my list after the basics like Principles of Communism. My intention is to make it easily digestible and complete for a beginner, not to be the end-all be-all list. If I made such a complete list, I'd of course put those longer and more complex works on it, but my target is the absolute beginner.
1
Makan - 2mon
never read this one
maybe i should
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Cowbee [he/they] - 2mon
You should! It's one of my favorites.
6
Makan - 2mon
Hell yeah
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cornishon - 2mon
Best introduction to dialectical materialism I've ever seen.
Weird. It didn't notify me when it was posted. (Unless it doesn't show up in Unread Messages)
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☭ 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗘𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿 ☭ - 2mon
it should; did anyone else mentioned get a notification?
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☭ 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗘𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿 ☭ - 2mon
As mentioned by @Comrade_Improving, there are some parts of the text where he uses a strange definition of dialectical change. I haven't studied Hegel's work directly, but my understanding is that every change is dialectical, a result of the interaction of two systems, processes, or whatever word you'd like to use. For example:
We see then that dialectical motion contains within itself processes or autodynamism, which is its essential feature. For not every motion or change is dialectical. If we approach the study of a flea from the dialectical viewpoint, we shall say that it has not always been what it is and that it will not always be what it is. If we crush it, this certainly represents a change for it, but will this change be dialectical? No. Without us, it would not have been crushed. Hence, this change is not dialectical, but mechanical.
Therefore, we must be careful when we speak of dialectical change. We think that if the earth continues to exist, capitalist society will be replaced by a socialist and then a Communist society. This will be a dialectical change. But, if the earth explodes, capitalist society will disappear not through an autodynamic change, but through a mechanical change.
Here, he makes a distinction between changes caused by human action and "natural" changes, as if humanity is not a result of, and part of, "nature". But this is just an interaction between the flea and the human, leading to the death of the flea (or some other variation). If a rock had fallen onto a flea and crushed it, if it had been eaten by another animal, or if it had died from any other cause, I wouldn't consider it "more dialectical" than the previous example. Similarly, changes in human society occur based on availability of resources, outside human influence, and many other things, not just the internal processes within that society; would the author consider these "mechanical" changes?
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Comrade_Improving - 1mon
I think it is important to note that what you are getting at is very similar to what lead to Politzer's limitation of his own method, the understanding that dialectical change happens externally as in "a result of the interaction of two systems, processes, etc.."
But as I demonstrated in my original comment: "in fact dialectical contradiction is the struggle between two stages of development (two identities, two categories, two moments, two possibilities, etc.) of a thing." Dialectical change describes the movement between to moments within the same thing, which is why we call them internal contradictions in the first place, and why Politzer could not expand dialectics to the external force, leaving it just as "the result of a purely mechanical change", the problem is not in the separation between Mechanical and Dialetical, because that problem is a consequence of the separation between external and internal factors.
So to answer your question I'd say that probably yes, it would make sense within Politzer's logic to say that "changes in human society" based on things "outside human influence" and therefore "not just the internal processes within that society" are "not the result of autodynamic stages; it is the result of a purely mechanical change", because as dialectics deals with the internal movement of things it is unable to deal with a force that is external to that process. Which is exactly the conclusion that Politzer reaches in the other examples that you and I have quoted.
But if we correctly apply Dialectical Materialism we understand that if a "change in human society" is occurring "based on availability of resources" it's certainly has been caused by "the internal processes within that society" because those changes will only happen if there is an actual necessity within that society for those resources in the first place. As quick modern example, rare-earth elements were "discovered" over 200 years ago, and have existed in nature for much longer than that, but only in modern times have humans developed abilities for it, found a use for it and consequently have had a necessity for it. So only after that necessity, generated from its own internal process, appeared, that the availability of those resources caused changes in human society.
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☭ 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗘𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿 ☭ - 1mon
I think it is important to note that what you are getting at is very similar to what lead to Politzer’s limitation of his own method, the understanding that dialectical change happens externally as in “a result of the interaction of two systems, processes, etc…”
That's not what I'm getting at. A society can be seen as a single system depending on the level of abstraction, but it's composed of many other systems, which are themselves composed of other systems, until we reach fundamental forces and particles. The difference between an external contradiction and an internal one is just a matter of perspective.
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Comrade_Improving - 1mon
The difference between an external contradiction and an internal one is just a matter of perspective
Not really though, because dialectics only deals with internal contradictions. Claiming that the difference is subjective and leaving part of it externally is exactly the logic of agnosticism/subjective idealism.
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☭ 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗘𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿 ☭ - 1mon
Not really though, because dialectics only deals with internal contradictions.
Perhaps Hegelian dialectics only deals with internal contradictions, but not materialist dialectics. From On Contradiction:
According to materialist dialectics, changes in nature are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in nature. Changes in society are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in society, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between classes and the contradiction between the old and the new; it is the development of these contradictions that pushes society forward and gives the impetus for the supersession of the old society by the new. Does materialist dialectics exclude external causes? Not at all. It holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes. In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis.
The internal contradictions of a thing are the basis for change, but those contradictions are not unaffected by external forces. If a deer stomps on an egg and crushes it, the force applied to the egg triggers internal changes within the egg, but the external contradiction between the deer and the egg is still important; and if you view it as a part of the collective life on Earth rather than as two separate "things", it's an internal contradiction.
Claiming that the difference is subjective and leaving part of it externally is exactly the logic of agnosticism/subjective idealism.
I didn't call it "subjective", I said that it's based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference, not personal opinion.
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Comrade_Improving - 1mon
Honestly, I'm very confused by your comment, you made 3 claims in it and subsequently proceeded to undermine them:
You start with: "Perhaps Hegelian dialectics only deals with internal contradictions, but not materialist dialectics." Therefore making both claims that: Hegelian Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics deal with contradictions differently and that at least one of those differences is the fact that the Materialist one also deals External contradictions.
But then show a quote from Mao saying quite the opposite:
::: spoiler Mao Zedong - On Contradiction
"According to materialist dialectics, changes in nature are due chiefly to the development of the internal contradictions in nature (...) It holds that external causes are the condition of change and internal causes are the basis of change, and that external causes become operative through internal causes."
:::
He is quite literally using the dialectical materialist concept of internal contradictions where they are the basis of the change and the external causes are the condition of those changes, you even understood that yourself: "The internal contradictions of a thing are the basis for change, but those contradictions are not unaffected by external forces". But Mao also adds that at the same time the external causes are not able to change the contradictions in themselves or in their essence, saying "In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis."
Mao also correctly applies the Hegelian concept of the dialectical interaction between the content and its form, and the process of "self-sublation" within a thing that I noted in my first comment and that Engels used in his explanation of the negation of the negation, which not only demonstrates similarities between how Hegelian Dialectics and Marxist Dialectics see contradictions but also shows that there even more similarities between methods, it is truly no coincidence that Engels said:
::: spoiler F. Engels - Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy
Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end — this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted.
:::
Lastly you said claimed: "I didn’t call it “subjective” but followed with: "it’s based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference". Which means that when a subject is analyzing an object, the difference between external and internal contradictions is given by the abstraction made by the subject themselves, and not by the object in itself, meaning that it is not defined by the object but by the subject, or in a word, it's subjective. So what you basically said was that you didn't call it "subjective", you just said that it is subjective.
So you understand the concept: "and if you view it as a part of the collective life on Earth rather than as two separate “things”, it’s an internal contradiction." You understand that change comes through the struggle between opposites, but then deny the unity between them and say that their correlation "it’s based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference." Completely missing the concept of unity of opposites, and consequently falling into agnosticism/subjective idealism.
::: spoiler V. Lenin - On the Question of Dialectics,
The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their “unity,”—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their “self-movement,” in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the “struggle” of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).
:::
What is becoming clear to me is that this a problem revolving more around the term itself than a lack of of understanding of the logic. Dialectical contradiction has a meaning that goes beyond mere opposition, and reaches the "identity of opposites", that's why it is such a central term in Materialist Dialectics and precisely why I started my original comment defining this term as it is and how it came to be (as it should be with the Dialectical Materialist method), but you denied that definition without proper consideration, and consequently had no alternative but to lose the objectiveness of Dialectics and fall into agnosticism/subjective idealism.
2
☭ 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗘𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿 ☭ - 1mon
You start with: “Perhaps Hegelian dialectics only deals with internal contradictions, but not materialist dialectics.” Therefore making both claims that: Hegelian Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics deal with contradictions differently and that at least one of those differences is the fact that the Materialist one also deals External contradictions.
No, I said that perhaps Hegelian dialectics only deals with internal contradictions. I did say that materialist dialectics deal with external contradictions as well, and this is confirmed by the quote; you claim that it isn't, but your own comment disproves that:
He is quite literally using the dialectical materialist concept of internal contradictions where they are the basis of the change and the external causes are the condition of those changes, you even understood that yourself: “The internal contradictions of a thing are the basis for change, but those contradictions are not unaffected by external forces”. But Mao also adds that at the same time the external causes are not able to change the contradictions in themselves or in their essence, saying “In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis.”
In other words, internal contradictions are primary and external contradictions are secondary. Being secondary is not the same thing as being irrelevant or ignored.
Lastly you said claimed: "I didn’t call it “subjective” but followed with: “it’s based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference”. Which means that when a subject is analyzing an object, the difference between external and internal contradictions is given by the abstraction made by the subject themselves, and not by the object in itself, meaning that it is not defined by the object but by the subject, or in a word, it’s subjective. So what you basically said was that you didn’t call it “subjective”, you just said that it is subjective.
If you want to categorize any kind of observation as "subjective", sure. Objective reality exists but we can't observe it objectively. If you choose to analyze a society as a whole, you're going to use that society as a point of reference, not a single person and not the entire solar system.
So you understand the concept: “and if you view it as a part of the collective life on Earth rather than as two separate “things”, it’s an internal contradiction.” You understand that change comes through the struggle between opposites, but then deny the unity between them and say that their correlation “it’s based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference.” Completely missing the concept of unity of opposites, and consequently falling into agnosticism/subjective idealism.
What is becoming clear to me is that this a problem revolving more around the term itself than a lack of of understanding of the logic. Dialectical contradiction has a meaning that goes beyond mere opposition, and reaches the “identity of opposites”, that’s why it is such a central term in Materialist Dialectics and precisely why I started my original comment defining this term as it is and how it came to be (as it should be with the Dialectical Materialist method), but you denied that definition without proper consideration, and consequently had no alternative but to lose the objectiveness of Dialectics and fall into agnosticism/subjective idealism.
I haven't denied the unity of opposites at any point in this thread. Your original comment made a "correction" based on the incorrect assumption that I believed only external contradictions were relevant, which I addressed in my reply. And you keep saying that I'm an idealist, but now you also claim that I'm just misusing terms? If you just want to argue about semantics, fine, but I'd appreciate if you'd stop misrepresenting what I say.
This is clearly not going anywhere, so I will not reply further.
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Comrade_Improving - 1mon
Your original comment made a “correction” based on the incorrect assumption that I believed only external contradictions were relevant
I didn't make that "correction", because I didn't make that assumption, what I was assuming, and still am, is that you are trying use "contradiction" as simple opposition, or even just a mere factor, leading you to see "external contradictions" when that in itself is an philosophical absurdity. If you understand the identity of opposites how are you going to claim that they can be about things external to one another?
If we follow your example that there is a contradiction between a deer and an egg, and follow the logic of unity of opposites with that contradiction, we would arrive at the conclusion that an egg can become a deer, or that the deer can become an egg. Which is only made worse by being "just a matter of perspective." Which would mean that if look hard enough we could find contradictions between anything and therefore claim that everything can become anything. Unless you actually believe in those absurdities, you have been mistaking the use of "contradiction", precisely because you are forgetting that it means the "unity of opposites" and not just mere opposition, or just a relevant factor.
::: spoiler V. Lenin - On the Question of Dialectics
In the first conception of motion, self - movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external—God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of “self” - movement.
The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the “self-movement” of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to “leaps,” to the “break in continuity,” to the “transformation into the opposite,” to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.
:::
Lenin is very clear in describing the metaphysical "conception of motion" as "lifeless, pale and dry" because "its source, its motive" is "made external—God, subject, etc." Which is exactly what happens if the source of the motion are "not just the internal processes" as you claim.
The contradictions are what guides the "content" internally, the "sources of the motion", while external factors are what determine its "form" as it appears in reality, the "conditions of change". It is because the source of the motion is internal that he denominates it "self-movement".
And you keep saying that I’m an idealist, but now you also claim that I’m just misusing terms
You are also looking at this metaphysically and therefore also arriving at more mistakes, but this is actually a fresh example of the unity of opposites: It is a consequence of the misuse of terms that you are falling into Subjective idealism/agnosticism, it is your misunderstanding of contradictions that is "self-sublating" into defining the process of change as subjective, consequently leading you to subjective idealism/agnosticism. You are seeing them as two different things, but in fact they are one and the same, they are part of the same dialectical movement, two moments within the same thing, they are all part of the essence of your logic.
::: spoiler V. Lenin - On the Question of Dialectics
The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative.
1
surjomukhi - 2mon
The link in the body goes to what is to be done.
3
RedCat - 2mon
On what basis were the previous texts chosen? Randomly?
3
☭ 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗶𝗻𝗘𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿 ☭ - 2mon
pinned suggestion threads
6
deathtoreddit - 2mon
Finally I understand a wee bit more of what metaphysics means in practice and what to avoid
We begin - and this enumeration will allow us to summarize - with
Seeing things in their immobility, in their identity.
Separating things from one another, detaching them from their mutual relationships.
Establishing eternal divisions between things, impassable walls.
Opposing opposites, affirming that two opposites cannot exist at the same time.
Also, mechanical and dialectical change distinguished
We see then that dialectical motion contains within itself processes or autodynamism, which is its essential feature. For not every motion or change is dialectical. If we approach the study of a flea from the dialectical viewpoint, we shall say that it has not always been what it is and that it will not always be what it is. If we crush it, this certainly represents a change for it, but will this change be dialectical? No. Without us, it would not have been crushed. Hence, this change is not dialectical, but mechanical.
Therefore, we must be careful when we speak of dialectical change. We think that if the earth continues to exist, capitalist society will be replaced by a socialist and then a Communist society. This will be a dialectical change. But, if the earth explodes, capitalist society will disappear not through an autodynamic change, but through a mechanical change.
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deathtoreddit - 2mon
Hence, here we recognize the characteristics and the great general laws of dialectics namely:
The interdependence of things and events.
Dialectical motion and change.
Autodynamism.
Contradiction.
Reciprocal action.
And evolution by leaps (transformation of quantity into quality).
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Vika - 2mon
I am reading this right now and I'm impressed. I've read philosophy, not understanding most books of course, but nothing aimed towards the average human being. I love the FAQ format it has as it makes it very accessible for people not used to reading. Thinking on finishing it and giving a copy to some relatives and my bf
GrainEater in theory
Politzer's "Elementary principles of philosophy" | Theory Discussion Group, Weeks 43-44 of 2025
https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Library:Elementary_principles_of_philosophyYou can read the text here.
You can post questions or share your thoughts at any time, even after we've moved on to a new text.
Suggest upcoming texts here.
::: spoiler Previous texts
This is basically the book you want for understanding diamat. No more excuses!
I recommend following along with the linked audiobook in the infobox, the audiobook is a slightly more digestible edition (so reading + listening). For maximum learning take notes while reading or try to synthesize the chapters with your own words.
It's part of my 6-book absolute beginner list. This will depend on your time but a- try to fit reading anywhere you can (on commute, on break) and b- you can break it up like so:
Reminder also on prolewiki you can tap the gear icon to customize your reading experience.
What are the other five books in the hexalogy?
all here https://en.prolewiki.org/wiki/Category:ProleWiki_absolute_beginner_reading_list
This is very good. I wish I had found it sooner. I'm really engaged in Diamat and I was looking for books that explained it in a systematic way.
The other book I know that does this kind of explanation is this one: https://www.lunaoi.com/product/the-worldview-and-philosophical-methodology-of-marxism-leninism-preorder/
I still have to read the one which addresses historical materialism.
This is the book that turned me into Marxism. I saw a suggestion to read it in a left-wing chanboard, bought the book, and how lucky was I that a random stranger in the internet gave me a goldmine. Once I read it, I finally realized my place as a human in time and space.
Holy hell this is a good read, if I stumbled upon this earlier I might not had a mental breakdown. So much dissonance and thoughts I have had has been put into perspective reading this. I really did not understand the difference between materialism and idealism until today and now I have a better understanding of dialectical materialism, thank you.
Good book. Wish I read it sooner it might have made the trip a lot easier. Feels like a good book to suggest to proto-comrades.
I agree, that's why I put it near the beginning of the ML intro list I made. It was super helpful with making Marxism "click" for me!
Huge comment with something that I was working some time ago:
Although Politzer makes a great job describing the history of Philosophy, Materialism and Dialectics in a way that is easy to follow. He has a crucial misunderstanding of dialectics and consequently is inconsistent in his own application of Dialectical Materialism, and as such I personally do not recommend this book for a beginner that won't be able to separate the mistakes from the correct parts.
His misunderstanding of dialectics centers around the way he views contradictions:
Politzer sees internal contradictions as two opposing forces inside a thing, when in fact dialectical contradiction is the struggle between two stages of development (two identities, two categories, two moments, two possibilities, etc.) of a thing.
The way that Hegelian Dialectics deals with contradictions actually comes from how Kant's Critical Philosophy dealt with the limitations of Metaphysics:
::: spoiler G.W.F. Hegel - Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline
But for dialectics, the contradictions within the determinations of things become the source of the "self-sublation" of things that lead to their continuous change.
::: spoiler More Hegel
The consequences of this misunderstanding become even more clear when he deals with "Affirmation, negation and negation of negation"
As for him contradictions are opposite forces (not moments, categories, etc.) every dialectical step becomes a destruction of the former and not a "sublation" of the thing into another chapter of its own movement.
Part 2:
Which also leads him to fall for the Subjective Idealism of Fichtean dialectics:
And consequently cause the contrast we can observe between him and Engels when the latter also deals with the negation of the negation:
::: spoiler F. Engels - Anti-Duhring - part I - Chapter XIII
:::
Which is made even more clear when they both use similar examples to explain their methods:
Chapter 4.2.3.3 - "Affirmation, negation and negation of negation":
F. Engels - Anti-Duhring - part I - Chapter XIII:
If we follow Politzers logic in Engels example we'd arrive in the conclusion that: after destroying the egg, the caterpillars' own negation, the chrysalis would already be the negation of the negation of the egg, before even getting to the butterfly. But with the dialectical Engels, the negation of the negation only appears when the insect's process comes back to its own beggining with the egg itself, in its own re-affirmation, in its own proliferation.
There thus appears the worst consequence of the confusion between hegelian and Fitchean Dialectics:
Politzer is forced to limit it's own dialectics claiming that it does not encompass an "purely mechanical change" and therefore leaves things to a an external force, not comprehensible by dialectical laws of internal contradictions, and in this moment he falls into agnosticism himself.
Contrasting his example of crushing a flea with Mao's example of the result of a battle:
::: spoiler Mao Zedong - On Contradiction - Chapter I
While Politzer sees the crushing of a flea caused by external factor and hence outside of dialectical consideration, if we follow Mao's dialectics in the same example we understand that it is a consequence of the flea's own internal contradictions that make it possible for the external force to crush it or not, therefore the cause and, dialeticaly, the solution, of whether it is resistant enough to resist the external force or not, lies within the flea itself.
He does realize the limitations of his own method, and as such warns us against it, but without adding on how to expand those limits of our own knowledge or how to approach this "purely mechanical change" he left outside dialectics, we are left in a state where there may be things that are incomprehensible by the human mind, giving even more way to agnosticism.
While still a minor mistake in his work, I've already seen people (even here) go against his cautions and expand this misunderstanding into the basis of dialectics, assuming that Marxist Dialectics is based on "thesis - Anti-thesis - synthesis" and consequently arriving at even greater errors.
As such even if most of this book is of great value for someone reading about dialectical materialism for the first time, it also contain a couple of misunderstandings that might lead to problems in inexperienced hands, because of that, for those that want an introduction to Dialectical Materialism I recommend to read instead: F. Engels - Socialism Utopian and Scientific, Mao - On Contradiction and M. Cornforth - Materialism and the Dialectical Method (specifically for those that already read Politzer's book, Mao's On Contradiction is a great way to expand in the exact aspect that this book was limited) and for a more complete comprehension of Marxist Dialectics, the essentials: F. Engels - Anti-Duhring and V. Lenin - Materialism and Empirio-criticism.
This was a great write-up, comrade. I've read Mao, so personally Politzer's mistake has been rectified in me, but I must've forgotten Politzer's framing of negation. I'm reconsidering leaving it in my intro ML reading list, I do put Mao right after but perhaps I should restructure that entirely.
Thanks, I have had the material for this write-up for quite some time, but only now had the situation that finaly pushed me into finishing it, definitely took longer than I expected...
Your consideration is a quite interesting one, because the book I recommend (M. Cornforth's) doesn't approach the history of philosophy with the same depth as Politzer's, so even if he explains Dialectical Materialism in more complete and correct manner, there is definitely going to be some loss in replacing one by the other. But then again, almost all the good points in Politzer's book are already contained in either Engels's "Anti-Duhring" or Lenin's "Materialism and empiro-criticism", so to the person that makes that far the confusion generated by this book is likely more damaging than its merits. You should consider what is more relevant in your opinion then.
The biggest obstacle in my eyes is that Cornforth's work isn't on Prolewiki or a similarly easy to read mobile format. My list is very intentionally targeting reading or listening on your phone as the baseline, with the option for the reader to use eReaders or physical copies if they desire.
I do plan on trimming some works (like Ian Paul Wright's essay). I would love to be able to throw Anti-Dühring and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism on the list, but I think those may be more advanced. It's a bit of a toss-up, really, and I'm open to new ideas. My list is a collaborative project anyways.
I get that obstacle personally, one of the consequences of the low popularity of Cornforth's work is that there is no translation of it in my native language, so I can only recommend it to people with very advanced english, which is very limiting. Considering that this book was the one that allowed me to understand Dialectical Materialism, it is kind of sad that it cannot be easily recommended because is not so accessible as a consequence of not being that popular in the first place, but sadly there's not much we can do about that now.
Also while I understand the need to make the reading as simple as possible, I do think that "Anti-Dühring" and "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism" are essentials in any theory reading list, they cover in great detail both sides of Dialectical Materialism and as such are great basis for anyone looking to become a Marxist. And at least for me personally, reading more complex books after having a better understanding of the logic behind them made it much easier than before, so in the long term those books can actually become time savers.
This is also my opinion, but the way I see it, the value of reading revolutionary theory is defined by how much you can act with it, which is why I give such importance to the understanding of Marxist Dialectics, because its correct comprehension can help guide actions both in personal matters as in more complex social ones, both in short and long term.
As they are the basis of Marxism, while one can learn Marxist Dialectics without learning Marxist social-economic theory, their scope of actions will just be considerably limited, the other way around actually poses multiple dangers, they can either hold the theory as dogmas and become ultras, see contradictions as a consequences of external factors and as such become revisionists thinking that a peaceful implementation of capitalism is possible, or at best become pure intellectuals who know important facts about the developments happening in our world, but are unable to take any action upon it.
I'm sorry this became quite a rant, but my main point is that not only does understanding of Marxist philosophy help the understanding of Marxist theory, but without revolutionary philosophy the revolutionary theory leads nowhere.
::: spoiler Mao - On Contradiction (VII. Conclusion)
I absolutely agree with the importance of developing solid understanding of dialectical materialism early, that's why it's the first section on my list after the basics like Principles of Communism. My intention is to make it easily digestible and complete for a beginner, not to be the end-all be-all list. If I made such a complete list, I'd of course put those longer and more complex works on it, but my target is the absolute beginner.
never read this one
maybe i should
You should! It's one of my favorites.
Hell yeah
Best introduction to dialectical materialism I've ever seen.
Yeah!
::: spoiler Notifications
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:::
Weird. It didn't notify me when it was posted. (Unless it doesn't show up in Unread Messages)
it should; did anyone else mentioned get a notification?
As mentioned by @Comrade_Improving, there are some parts of the text where he uses a strange definition of dialectical change. I haven't studied Hegel's work directly, but my understanding is that every change is dialectical, a result of the interaction of two systems, processes, or whatever word you'd like to use. For example:
Here, he makes a distinction between changes caused by human action and "natural" changes, as if humanity is not a result of, and part of, "nature". But this is just an interaction between the flea and the human, leading to the death of the flea (or some other variation). If a rock had fallen onto a flea and crushed it, if it had been eaten by another animal, or if it had died from any other cause, I wouldn't consider it "more dialectical" than the previous example. Similarly, changes in human society occur based on availability of resources, outside human influence, and many other things, not just the internal processes within that society; would the author consider these "mechanical" changes?
I think it is important to note that what you are getting at is very similar to what lead to Politzer's limitation of his own method, the understanding that dialectical change happens externally as in "a result of the interaction of two systems, processes, etc.."
But as I demonstrated in my original comment: "in fact dialectical contradiction is the struggle between two stages of development (two identities, two categories, two moments, two possibilities, etc.) of a thing." Dialectical change describes the movement between to moments within the same thing, which is why we call them internal contradictions in the first place, and why Politzer could not expand dialectics to the external force, leaving it just as "the result of a purely mechanical change", the problem is not in the separation between Mechanical and Dialetical, because that problem is a consequence of the separation between external and internal factors.
So to answer your question I'd say that probably yes, it would make sense within Politzer's logic to say that "changes in human society" based on things "outside human influence" and therefore "not just the internal processes within that society" are "not the result of autodynamic stages; it is the result of a purely mechanical change", because as dialectics deals with the internal movement of things it is unable to deal with a force that is external to that process. Which is exactly the conclusion that Politzer reaches in the other examples that you and I have quoted.
But if we correctly apply Dialectical Materialism we understand that if a "change in human society" is occurring "based on availability of resources" it's certainly has been caused by "the internal processes within that society" because those changes will only happen if there is an actual necessity within that society for those resources in the first place. As quick modern example, rare-earth elements were "discovered" over 200 years ago, and have existed in nature for much longer than that, but only in modern times have humans developed abilities for it, found a use for it and consequently have had a necessity for it. So only after that necessity, generated from its own internal process, appeared, that the availability of those resources caused changes in human society.
That's not what I'm getting at. A society can be seen as a single system depending on the level of abstraction, but it's composed of many other systems, which are themselves composed of other systems, until we reach fundamental forces and particles. The difference between an external contradiction and an internal one is just a matter of perspective.
Not really though, because dialectics only deals with internal contradictions. Claiming that the difference is subjective and leaving part of it externally is exactly the logic of agnosticism/subjective idealism.
Perhaps Hegelian dialectics only deals with internal contradictions, but not materialist dialectics. From On Contradiction:
The internal contradictions of a thing are the basis for change, but those contradictions are not unaffected by external forces. If a deer stomps on an egg and crushes it, the force applied to the egg triggers internal changes within the egg, but the external contradiction between the deer and the egg is still important; and if you view it as a part of the collective life on Earth rather than as two separate "things", it's an internal contradiction.
I didn't call it "subjective", I said that it's based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference, not personal opinion.
Honestly, I'm very confused by your comment, you made 3 claims in it and subsequently proceeded to undermine them:
You start with: "Perhaps Hegelian dialectics only deals with internal contradictions, but not materialist dialectics." Therefore making both claims that: Hegelian Dialectics and Materialist Dialectics deal with contradictions differently and that at least one of those differences is the fact that the Materialist one also deals External contradictions.
But then show a quote from Mao saying quite the opposite:
::: spoiler Mao Zedong - On Contradiction
He is quite literally using the dialectical materialist concept of internal contradictions where they are the basis of the change and the external causes are the condition of those changes, you even understood that yourself: "The internal contradictions of a thing are the basis for change, but those contradictions are not unaffected by external forces". But Mao also adds that at the same time the external causes are not able to change the contradictions in themselves or in their essence, saying "In a suitable temperature an egg changes into a chicken, but no temperature can change a stone into a chicken, because each has a different basis."
Mao also correctly applies the Hegelian concept of the dialectical interaction between the content and its form, and the process of "self-sublation" within a thing that I noted in my first comment and that Engels used in his explanation of the negation of the negation, which not only demonstrates similarities between how Hegelian Dialectics and Marxist Dialectics see contradictions but also shows that there even more similarities between methods, it is truly no coincidence that Engels said:
::: spoiler F. Engels - Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy
Lastly you said claimed: "I didn’t call it “subjective” but followed with: "it’s based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference". Which means that when a subject is analyzing an object, the difference between external and internal contradictions is given by the abstraction made by the subject themselves, and not by the object in itself, meaning that it is not defined by the object but by the subject, or in a word, it's subjective. So what you basically said was that you didn't call it "subjective", you just said that it is subjective.
So you understand the concept: "and if you view it as a part of the collective life on Earth rather than as two separate “things”, it’s an internal contradiction." You understand that change comes through the struggle between opposites, but then deny the unity between them and say that their correlation "it’s based on level of abstraction. It depends on the point of reference." Completely missing the concept of unity of opposites, and consequently falling into agnosticism/subjective idealism.
::: spoiler V. Lenin - On the Question of Dialectics,
What is becoming clear to me is that this a problem revolving more around the term itself than a lack of of understanding of the logic. Dialectical contradiction has a meaning that goes beyond mere opposition, and reaches the "identity of opposites", that's why it is such a central term in Materialist Dialectics and precisely why I started my original comment defining this term as it is and how it came to be (as it should be with the Dialectical Materialist method), but you denied that definition without proper consideration, and consequently had no alternative but to lose the objectiveness of Dialectics and fall into agnosticism/subjective idealism.
No, I said that perhaps Hegelian dialectics only deals with internal contradictions. I did say that materialist dialectics deal with external contradictions as well, and this is confirmed by the quote; you claim that it isn't, but your own comment disproves that:
In other words, internal contradictions are primary and external contradictions are secondary. Being secondary is not the same thing as being irrelevant or ignored.
If you want to categorize any kind of observation as "subjective", sure. Objective reality exists but we can't observe it objectively. If you choose to analyze a society as a whole, you're going to use that society as a point of reference, not a single person and not the entire solar system.
I haven't denied the unity of opposites at any point in this thread. Your original comment made a "correction" based on the incorrect assumption that I believed only external contradictions were relevant, which I addressed in my reply. And you keep saying that I'm an idealist, but now you also claim that I'm just misusing terms? If you just want to argue about semantics, fine, but I'd appreciate if you'd stop misrepresenting what I say.
This is clearly not going anywhere, so I will not reply further.
I didn't make that "correction", because I didn't make that assumption, what I was assuming, and still am, is that you are trying use "contradiction" as simple opposition, or even just a mere factor, leading you to see "external contradictions" when that in itself is an philosophical absurdity. If you understand the identity of opposites how are you going to claim that they can be about things external to one another?
If we follow your example that there is a contradiction between a deer and an egg, and follow the logic of unity of opposites with that contradiction, we would arrive at the conclusion that an egg can become a deer, or that the deer can become an egg. Which is only made worse by being "just a matter of perspective." Which would mean that if look hard enough we could find contradictions between anything and therefore claim that everything can become anything. Unless you actually believe in those absurdities, you have been mistaking the use of "contradiction", precisely because you are forgetting that it means the "unity of opposites" and not just mere opposition, or just a relevant factor.
::: spoiler V. Lenin - On the Question of Dialectics
Lenin is very clear in describing the metaphysical "conception of motion" as "lifeless, pale and dry" because "its source, its motive" is "made external—God, subject, etc." Which is exactly what happens if the source of the motion are "not just the internal processes" as you claim.
The contradictions are what guides the "content" internally, the "sources of the motion", while external factors are what determine its "form" as it appears in reality, the "conditions of change". It is because the source of the motion is internal that he denominates it "self-movement".
You are also looking at this metaphysically and therefore also arriving at more mistakes, but this is actually a fresh example of the unity of opposites: It is a consequence of the misuse of terms that you are falling into Subjective idealism/agnosticism, it is your misunderstanding of contradictions that is "self-sublating" into defining the process of change as subjective, consequently leading you to subjective idealism/agnosticism. You are seeing them as two different things, but in fact they are one and the same, they are part of the same dialectical movement, two moments within the same thing, they are all part of the essence of your logic.
::: spoiler V. Lenin - On the Question of Dialectics
The link in the body goes to what is to be done.
On what basis were the previous texts chosen? Randomly?
pinned suggestion threads
Finally I understand a wee bit more of what metaphysics means in practice and what to avoid
Also, mechanical and dialectical change distinguished
I am reading this right now and I'm impressed. I've read philosophy, not understanding most books of course, but nothing aimed towards the average human being. I love the FAQ format it has as it makes it very accessible for people not used to reading. Thinking on finishing it and giving a copy to some relatives and my bf