cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/47786060

Archived

A teacher. A college student. And even a construction worker.

To the casual observer scrolling through Facebook, these profiles would look like ordinary Filipinos. A teacher posting about classroom experience, students interacting with other students, and an ordinary worker sharing glimpses of his daily grind. They had names, faces, and opinions.

The problem: they’re not real people but carefully curated masks, created by a covert unit of “dedicated keyboard warriors” paid to infiltrate the daily conversations of Filipinos, as part of sophisticated and foreign-funded operations.

Internal onboarding documents from InfinitUs Marketing Solutions, a marketing firm allegedly hired by the Chinese embassy, show what could be information operations designed to “change the overall negative perception of Filipinos about the Chinese and China,” according to its written guidelines.

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InfinitUs’ alleged client is the Chinese embassy in the Philippines, which would implicate the People’s Republic of China in domestic interference. And while this is not the first time that Beijing has been linked to coordinated information operations in the Philippines, the leaked documents provide a rare and granular look at the “outsourcing” of these operations to local firms, weaponizing Filipinos against their own democracy.

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The agency’s “social media army” included 300 Facebook accounts and 30 X accounts managed by a team of 11 operatives, including one team leader. Each operative was expected to “maintain and nurture” at least 20 accounts, each with different personas.

These manufactured “personas” were the backbone of the alleged P3.7-million (roughly $200,000 US dollars) operation to deploy “keyboard warriors” in Philippine social media spaces, based on the copy of the alleged service agreement contract between the embassy and the agency.

Every member of the team was expected to produce 700 to 1,000 comments and shares every month. They also monitored Facebook posts for any anti-China posts and comments.

“On a daily basis, team members should seek out public Facebook Posts that could be a potential target for hate comments against China or FB Posts that are garnering anti-China comments, then inform the team to operate on it succeedingly [sic],” the document’s instructions said.

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Operatives were provided with operational guidelines and protocols, which included the creation of Facebook accounts with different identities and personalities, specifically one that would “best represent a person who would likely be objective about China, its role and presence in the country.” [The linked article provides examples for such guidelines as screenshots.]

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Once the accounts were established, they were weaponized to push specific political narratives and attack critics, as shown in what was labeled as a monthly report on their issue management operations. This included “Tone and Voice” guidelines that operatives echoed in their campaign.

In one instance, the “army” was deployed to launch an “aggressive comment campaign” against Surigao del Norte Representative Robert Ace Barbers after he made negative comments about China. “Mahilig kayo magsupporta sa mga batas na mali at walang basehan!” one of the suggested lines said, referring to new maritime laws signed by the President to operationalize the 2016 arbitral award.

The narratives pushed by the network went beyond mere pro-China sentiments but actively sought to undermine the Philippine government’s position on the West Philippine Sea.

Responding to the enactment of the Philippine’s Maritime Zones Act and Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act in 2025, one script instructed operatives to say that “China has all the right to oppose this because it runs counter to their territorial stand.” Another suggested that “the Philippine government should not have passed these laws because they very well know that it will intensify our conflict with China and other Asian neighbours.”

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Conversely, the “social media army” was tasked with praising Chinese officials. When the Chinese Ambassador or the embassy posted content, the operatives were instructed to “support the advocacies and activities.” Suggested positive comments included “China made a solemn commitment to the world to make Planet Earth a better place to live in” and “Thank you Chairman President Xi for leading the way.”

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InfinitUS is not the first case study of commercialized disinformation put to light.

“What makes this case unique is that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has always denied interfering with domestic issues. They do that because they’re a country with diplomatic relations with the Philippines. It’s improper for foreign mission to be interfering with domestic issues,” said Marco*, not his real name, a national security expert who wished to remain anonymous.

“What’s unique about this case is the fact that we have documented and evidence-based studies which proves that PRC interferes with the domestic policy of the Philippines.”

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations prohibits foreign missions from meddling in domestic politics or social issues: “Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State. It is also their duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.”

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Security experts have already talked about how modern conflict has gone beyond physical threats.

Philip Fortuno, who wrote the book Cognitive Domain: A Neoteric Space for Warfare, described the “cognitive domain” as the ultimate evolution of conflict. In traditional warfare, the objective is to degrade the enemy’s physical capacity to fight. In cognitive warfare, the objective is to “influence, disrupt, and corrupt” the decision-making of a target population without firing a single shot.

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This is not the first time that Beijing has been linked to coordinated information operations in the Philippines. Rappler has been looking into Chinese information operations in the Philippines as early as 2018. A Rappler report in 2023 exposed how Chinese state media content was systematically amplified by questionable news sites and coordinated Facebook groups to drown out criticism of Beijing. That investigation found that narratives were often seeded by state actors and then artificially boosted to create an illusion of public support.

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[One expert] said what is required is a whole-of-society approach. On the defensive side, [the expert] highlighted the need for a new superbody that will lead the government’s approach to responding to these threats. He noted that different agencies have approached this problem in different ways, but there needs to be a streamlining of the government’s thinking and response.

More important is the need to increase our citizens’ cognitive resilience through education. “All wars start in the mind,” [the expert] said. “We have to protect our mind — whoever you are. Our mind is what separates us from animals.”

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The challenge ahead

The InfinitUs case proves that the war for the cognitive domain may not be a future threat but an ongoing operation. The “teacher” commenting on a news feed, the “student” sharing a viral post, and the “construction worker” mocking the President may not be fellow citizens exercising their freedom of speech but “dedicated keyboard warriors” on a foreign payroll, executing a script designed to destabilize a nation from within.

The war is indeed being fought on two fronts. The visible one — of coast guard cutters, supply missions, and diplomatic protests — and the invisible one, which is fought in the comment sections, group chats, and trending topics of social media.