For 12 weeks, I will post a weekly mini-series on the manuscript Theses on Feuerbach (1845) by Karl Marx. To keep it quick and digestible, I will review only one thesis per post.
I am a layperson, so I welcome any discussion, especially (but not only) if you have expertise and can fill in the gaps. I don't pretend to be an expert.
Thesis I
The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. Hence, in The Essence of Christianity, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity.
My thoughts
Immediately, Marx situates his critique and Feuerbach within a larger materialist tradition. We know from Marx's other writings that he is, himself, a materialist, or at least some type thereof. From the first words of the Theses we can gather Marx's purpose: to rescue materialism by correcting it.
Reality, sensuousness — these words refer to the position of materialists that matter is the substance of things which exist. This position of ontology usually (but not necessarily) pairs with an epistemological position that knowledge can only, in the final analysis, derive from the senses. Knowledge cannot be acquired through pure contemplation. Until it is tested empirically — through interaction with the material world — it cannot properly be called knowledge.
All hitherto existing materialism, Marx says, conceives of reality as a sensuous external object. Humankind confronts reality as a third party, observing this alien thing from the outside. Rather than forming part of reality, humankind is set to one side so that reality can be defined in cold, sterile abstraction. More than that, this abstraction is entirely static and nonliving. Reality so-conceived is not a living organism comprising dynamic elements in motion and change. It is a snapshot, frozen in time, unchanging and permanent.
Hence we arrive at the ironic circumstance that it is idealism which has maintained the "active side" of reality as an object of contemplation; yet idealism contemplates activity, not of matter, but of abstractions.
How can materialism recover the active side of reality? Marx hints at an answer. It must have something to do with conceiving of human activity as intrinsic to reality, as an objective thing in itself. A complete conception of reality must therefore include human activity. Reality must be regarded as something not purely external, viewed from without, but participatory, matter which conceives of itself from a dynamic, yet limited and one-sided, perspective.
Feuerbach, being a materialist, wants to advance beyond idealism which conceives only of "thought objects" as the substance of reality. He wants to assert the materiality (sensuousness) of reality and to re-orient contemplation as contemplation of material things without all the mysticism. But because he does not include human activity in this conception, he does not recognize the effect of human activity on material reality. Feuerbach views practice (human activity) as a mere manifestation of the "human attitude" while the philosophers, such as he, are the genuine revolutionaries. (I read "human attitude" as humanism, but I am curious if someone has a better interpretation!)
Human activity shapes past, present, and future reality, of course always grounded on that material basis which Feuerbach conceives in isolation. Humankind can therefore consciously change reality, change the future, through a "revolutionary", "practical-critical" process in which humankind interacts with the world, observes the effects, and adjusts future behavior accordingly.
quarrk in theory
Week 2 of 12 - Theses on Feuerbach - Thesis I
Thread link - Week 1 - Background
Theses on Feuerbach
For 12 weeks, I will post a weekly mini-series on the manuscript Theses on Feuerbach (1845) by Karl Marx. To keep it quick and digestible, I will review only one thesis per post.
I am a layperson, so I welcome any discussion, especially (but not only) if you have expertise and can fill in the gaps. I don't pretend to be an expert.
Thesis I
My thoughts
Immediately, Marx situates his critique and Feuerbach within a larger materialist tradition. We know from Marx's other writings that he is, himself, a materialist, or at least some type thereof. From the first words of the Theses we can gather Marx's purpose: to rescue materialism by correcting it.
Reality, sensuousness — these words refer to the position of materialists that matter is the substance of things which exist. This position of ontology usually (but not necessarily) pairs with an epistemological position that knowledge can only, in the final analysis, derive from the senses. Knowledge cannot be acquired through pure contemplation. Until it is tested empirically — through interaction with the material world — it cannot properly be called knowledge.
All hitherto existing materialism, Marx says, conceives of reality as a sensuous external object. Humankind confronts reality as a third party, observing this alien thing from the outside. Rather than forming part of reality, humankind is set to one side so that reality can be defined in cold, sterile abstraction. More than that, this abstraction is entirely static and nonliving. Reality so-conceived is not a living organism comprising dynamic elements in motion and change. It is a snapshot, frozen in time, unchanging and permanent.
Hence we arrive at the ironic circumstance that it is idealism which has maintained the "active side" of reality as an object of contemplation; yet idealism contemplates activity, not of matter, but of abstractions.
How can materialism recover the active side of reality? Marx hints at an answer. It must have something to do with conceiving of human activity as intrinsic to reality, as an objective thing in itself. A complete conception of reality must therefore include human activity. Reality must be regarded as something not purely external, viewed from without, but participatory, matter which conceives of itself from a dynamic, yet limited and one-sided, perspective.
Feuerbach, being a materialist, wants to advance beyond idealism which conceives only of "thought objects" as the substance of reality. He wants to assert the materiality (sensuousness) of reality and to re-orient contemplation as contemplation of material things without all the mysticism. But because he does not include human activity in this conception, he does not recognize the effect of human activity on material reality. Feuerbach views practice (human activity) as a mere manifestation of the "human attitude" while the philosophers, such as he, are the genuine revolutionaries. (I read "human attitude" as humanism, but I am curious if someone has a better interpretation!)
Human activity shapes past, present, and future reality, of course always grounded on that material basis which Feuerbach conceives in isolation. Humankind can therefore consciously change reality, change the future, through a "revolutionary", "practical-critical" process in which humankind interacts with the world, observes the effects, and adjusts future behavior accordingly.